Author: Laura Bowen
CIA analyst Melvin A. Goodman delivered the latest Global Affairs Brown Bag presentation on Wednesday, April 9. Goodman served as a CIA analyst for two decades (1966-1986). His latest book, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA, provided the outline for his talk as he gave an overview of the CIA’s history and its biggest mistakes, as well as what needs to be done to fix its flaws.
Goodman began by explaining that the CIA’s history can basically be characterized by controversy, because, as he put it, “it was controversial from day one.” The CIA was started in 1947 by President Truman in a response to Pearl Harbor and the Cold War, among other things. However, “the military [the Pentagon] did not want an independent intelligence agency,” Goodman said. This fact is contrasted with the current entangled and coordinated actions of the Pentagon and the CIA.
After three decades in operation, in response to the CIA’s violation of domestic laws during the Vietnam War, “Congress set up a legitimate official authoritative oversight process . . . This was long overdue,” Goodman said. Similarly, following the Iran-Contra controversy in 1987, a Statutory Inspector General was assigned to regulate actions from within the CIA itself. However, current controversy in the CIA is still occurring and is publicized, but “there has been no call for real reform,” Goodman said.
Goodman went on to clarify what the CIA is actually responsible for and capable of doing. The three areas he detailed were science and technology (for example, satellite tracking), arms control (which has been essentially disbanded by the Bush administration, according to Goodman) and intelligence analysis (namely, the annual National Intelligence Estimate).
While Goodman recognized that the CIA has been successful in matters such as ex-filtration (getting people out of potentially dangerous areas before there is conflict), he addressed three major failures of intelligence and what needs to be done to reorganize the CIA and its operations. The three biggest mistakes, he said, were the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s, the failure to foresee 9/11 and the decision to begin the Iraq War. Goodman said the Iraq War was by far the worst of the three, explaining that those who compiled the National Intelligence Estimate that motivated the government to enter the Iraq War “prepared probably the worst estimate in the history of the intelligence agency.” He said US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech on entering Iraq had actually been written for him at the CIA. “All were fraudulent . . . some were intelligence fabrications,” Goodman said, describing Powell’s evidence.
Goodman asked how we can restore the CIA as a source of reliable information. He said the CIA needed to demilitarize, or break away from its connections with the Pentagon. “The worst possible place for conducting independent intelligence analysis is the Pentagon,” Goodman said. According to Goodman, the CIA also needs to be decentralized, to allow for opposing opinions and dissent, as opposed to a uniform-most likely fraudulent-intelligence analysis. Furthermore, he said, regaining more oversight, both internally and externally, of the CIA’s operations and analysis will deter illegitimacy.
Considering that the U.S. spends, according to Goodman, “more money on intelligence than [all] other countries combined,” it seems logical to demand intelligence that is actually based on truths. Who will carry out these changes, however, is still up in the air. In terms of presidential candidates, Goodman noted Obama as having the most potential, yet he found shortcomings in all three of the candidates.
Goodman’s expansive knowledge and years of experience were quite apparent to members of the audience. Madeline Rose (first-year) said, “He definitely knew what he was talking about . . . I had no idea that the CIA had this many issues, and I don’t think most Americans do either. I’m glad he’s bringing it to people’s attention.”
Politics Professor Caroline Heldman agreed, saying, “I think Mr. Goodman’s insights into the fall of the CIA were incredibly useful in understanding major failures of intelligence in the past couple of decades. His non-partisan approach to the issue made his arguments all the more convincing.”
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